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Abstract
This paper focuses on two crucial referendums on a Scottish body of self–
government: the referendum of 1979, when devolution failed to attract 
enough support and the referendum of 1997 when devolution was endorsed. 
The paper offers a detailed examination of the period in–between. The rise of 
the SNP and the reactions of Labour and the Tories to this are investigated in 
connection with the way of devolution. It is argued that the democratic deficit, 
the growing influence of the European Union, and the revaluation of the 
Scottish national identity together led to the success of the 1997 referendum.
Keywords: Devolution, Scottish Parliament, UK referendums, SNP
Introduction
The citizens of the European Union nowadays can observe two totally 
opposing impulses. On the one hand, the spread of globalisation and the 
expansion of transnational organisations are characteristic of EU. On the 
other hand, various national aspirations for self–determination, the rebirth of 
nationalism is to be observed. The power of the nation state is under pressure 
from two directions, from above, from the supra–national level and from 
below, from the level of national or regional autonomists. At the same time, 
the national state identities are questioned by sub– and supra–state identities. 
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Nationalism newly emerges especially in the case of the “nations without 
states” (Guibernau 2005, 1) for example in Catalonia, the Basque Country, 
Flanders, Wales and Scotland.
In the case of the United Kingdom the presence and the role of the “nations 
without states,” the Welsh and the Scots, were and are highly determinant 
from a constitutional point of view. The Union of the English and Scottish 
Parliaments in 1707 resulted in the transformation of the English Kingdom. 
Although with various force and success, the “Celtic fringe’s” demand for 
Home Rule had been present till the second half of the twentieth century. 
The breakthrough in this campaign was accompanied by the need for 
constitutional reform; the claim to self–government in Scotland and Wales 
stimulated the decentralization of the United Kingdom.
The devolution issue is one of the most hotly debated segments of the whole 
constitutional reform process; this is especially true in the case of Scotland 
(Stenhouse 2004, 8-27). In this paper I intend to focus on two crucial moments 
of the campaign for devolution in post–war Scottish history: the referendums 
of 1979 and 1997. My aim is to investigate which internal political, economic, 
and social and which external factors led to the success of the referendum of 
1997 in Scotland after the unsuccessful referendum in 1979. I will argue that 
this change can be related to three major factors: firstly, the decline of Britain 
in world politics and in connection with this the changes of the deep structure 
of the British political and economic system, secondly, the revaluation of the 
British-Scottish-European (Continental) relations within the European Union, 
thirdly, the change of Scottish self–understanding. In my view, these factors 
complement each other and at the same time they stimulate one another, none 
of them is responsible for the change in the Scottish attitude to devolution on 
its own.
1. Campaign for Self–government in Scotland since 1707
The roots of the consciousness of being a separate community, especially 
among members of “nations without states,” originated in the past in which 
the particular nation concerned had its own political institutions. The 
current strengthening of nationalist movements among “nations without 
states” is characteristic of nations which once enjoyed an independent or at 
least autonomous political and cultural identity that is now being invoked, 
reinterpreted under new socio–political circumstances. To understand their 
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motives in the twentieth century, these “roots of consciousness” have to be 
examined first (Guibernau 2005, 2).
Unofficially the Scottish campaign for self–governance exists since Scotland 
and England were de jure united in 1603 when James VI of Scotland became 
the ruler of England under the name of James I. Despite this, the de facto 
unification of the two countries was not realized in the seventeenth century. 
This higher level of unification was reached in 1707 when the Act of Union 
united the parliaments of England and Scotland (Mackie 1991, 221-262).
Parallel to this process the establishment of the special British–Scottish 
dual identity began. Foreign affairs contributed to locking Scottish politics 
into a British framework. From the middle of the eighteenth century the series 
of wars against France, a country ruled by the “ancien regime,” appeared 
in the British propaganda as a fight for the defence of British liberty. After 
1789 that liberty was threatened by the revolutionary terror of republican 
France and what mattered in Scotland at this time was the unprecedented 
popularity which these wars added to being Protestant and British (Brown 
et al. 1998, 4-5). In the course of this period the notion of Scottish identity 
became ancillary to the common British self–definition (Colley 1992, 78-84).
Nevertheless, localism remained strong and came gradually into opposition 
with the power of the central state. Scotland developed its own version of 
the central state in the form of the Scottish Secretary and the Scottish Office. In 
1885 the first Secretary for Scotland was appointed, in response to nationalist 
campaigning for Scottish matters to be given more attention by Westminster. 
The creation of the post extended the subordination of Scottish affairs to 
English party politics.
During the nineteenth century a strong sense of British national identity 
was established, but this did not alter the fact that Scots continued to identify 
themselves as Scottish and saw their country as a partner of England in 
colonization. What is especially significant for understanding the special 
nature of Scottish nationalism is that the Scottish elite was not interested in 
acting as the opposition to London, for example in bringing up the questions 
of constitutional issues or the renegotiating of the Act of Union. In the long run 
this attitude led to the evolution of an idea that Robert Christian Thomsen calls 
“safe nationalism” (Thomsen 2000, 56). This manifested itself in celebrating 
Scottish culture and traditions, but did not deal with defining political goals.
The First World War and the peace treaties on the one hand diverted 
attention away from Scottish issues, but on the other hand it was a period 
in which the right of self–determination came to the foreground and several 
small nation–states appeared on the map of Europe. All these contributed 
to the fact that the Anglo–Irish treaty and the solution of the Irish kept the 
Scottish Home Rule on the agenda. From the early 1930s, because of the Great 
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Depression, constitutional issues became less important. During World War 
II, a great sense of ‘Britishness’ developed, while the ‘Scottish’ feature of the 
Scottish dual identity was pushed into the background.
In the interwar period a new actor appeared in Scottish political life: modern 
political nationalism established its official organisations. The National Party 
of Scotland was formed in 1928 and united with the Scottish Party in 1934 
as the Scottish National Party (SNP). Initially the SNP’s aims were to secure 
Home Rule and the reestablishment of the Scottish Parliament within the 
United Kingdom rather than independence. In the immediate post–war years 
the SNP had very limited political impact (Devine 1999, 325-326).
From the 1960s due to economic difficulties the economic credibility of the 
United Kingdom was questioned as never before. The Scottish economy was 
in trouble, because of its outdated structure. The dominant British streak of 
the Scottish identity started to be questioned in the sixties when the “Trinity” 
of Protestantism, the Empire and capital was undermined by decolonization, 
secularization and economic recession (Bond és Rosie 2000, 107-108). The 
economic crisis contributed to the first electoral success of the SNP at the 
post–war period. They gained support not as the party of independence or 
separatism, but as the party that could speak for Scotland against the “London 
parties.” This attitude to the SNP mirrored the special Scottish identity, and 
the SNP came to be seen as a pressure group for Scottish interests (Bogdanor 
1999, 124). However it would be a failure to explain the rise of the SNP only 
by protest votes. Because of its social democratic nature, the votes for the 
SNP were and are as much votes for continuing the social democratic welfare 
project in Scotland (Brown et al. 1998, 21).
Without the rise and electoral success of the SNP in the late 1960s and in the 
1970s it is doubtful whether devolution would have gained such a prominent 
place on the political agenda of the UK (Finlay 2004, 328). All political parties 
committed themselves to a measure of Scottish self–government. Obviously, 
the reaction of Labour and the Conservatives to growing Scottish Nationalist 
support during this period can be interpreted less as an attempt to decentralize 
the government of the United Kingdom than as an elaborate tactical response 
to the complex relationship within and between the two parties (Leicester 
1996, 613).
The Nationalists were given a further boost with the discovery of North 
Sea oil in 1966. Their share of the electorate rose dramatically over the next 
elections (1970, February 1974, October 1974). The strengthening of the SNP, 
the spread of nationalism occurred in the UK at a time when the oil of the 
Scottish coast was vital to the reorganisation of the British economy.
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2. The Referendums of 1979 and 1997: Background and 
Analysis
The two referendums on a Scottish body of self–government are crucial points 
of twentieth century Scottish history. The results highlight the background of 
the gradual changes of the British party politics, economy and the slip in the 
Scottish dual identity.
To understand Scotland in the 1970s it is important to keep in mind that 
the first devolution bill was mostly prepared in London by politicians who 
misjudged the situation north of the border from several aspects. The idea 
of national assemblies in Wales and Scotland was proposed by The Royal 
Commission on the UK Constitution (Paterson 1998, 51-58). After the result of 
the general election of 1974 Harold Wilson took office as Prime Minister of 
a minority Labour government and acted on the proposals prepared by the 
Commission.
The first – Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and Wales – and 
the second – Our Changing Democracy – White Paper on the issue by the Wilson 
government formed the basis of the Scotland and Wales Bill, which received 
the Royal Assent in 1978 (Paterson 1998, 92-96). The bill passed only with 
amendments. According to the “Ferres amendment” if any Commons’ vote 
on a matter devolved to Scotland were passed through the votes of Scottish 
MPs, a second vote is required to be taken two weeks after the first where the 
Scottish MPs were to be pressured not to participate. The second amendment, 
the so called “40% rule” or “Cunningham amendment,” stated that if less 
than 40% of the registered electorate vote ‘Yes,’ on the referendum about 
the Scottish and Welsh assemblies then the Scotland and Wales Act granting 
devolution would not take effect (Bogdanor 1999, 227). 
By 1979 the public in Scotland became weary of the devolution issue while 
the parties were divided over it. Due to the nationalist misgivings, trade 
union misbehaviour, government unpopularity, defective organisation the 
referendum promised at best a very close result. The referendum held on 1 
March 1979 resulted in a narrow victory for devolution (51.6%) on a turnout 
of 62.9% of the electorate. The outcome fell short of the 40% the Act required 
to be implemented (only 32.85% of the whole Scottish electorate voted Yes). 
Though the result was disastrous, it was not especially surprising: devolution 
carried the stigma of a failing government. Labour’s policy on devolution 
reflected a mixture of pressures and influences (Tanner 2006, 557). Devolution 
in the 1970s was, as I see, a mere phase in a political match at Westminster.
Indeed, there would have been no need for the referendum at all. Actually, 
referendums are not part of the usual British constitutional practice, and 
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all referendums held in the United Kingdom, in theory, are advisory only. 
Numerous other strategic and tactical mistakes can be listed: the Labour 
Party’s inability to develop some widely acceptable form of decentralized 
governance; the division within the ‘Yes’ side; conflicting massages from 
the ‘Yes’ side reaching the voters and so on. The most eye–catching of these 
was the requirement for 40 per cent of registered electorate’s support for the 
creation of a Scottish Parliament forced upon the government by Labour’s 
own backbenchers (Scott 1991, 193-196).
In addition to these, the government was also forced to hold the referendum 
before the General Election to avoid synchronisation which would have made 
high participation in the referendum more likely (Bochel et al. 1981, 141). From 
a strategic point of view the lack of provision for the publication of campaign 
accounts, the absence of financial aid to the campaigns, the unorganized 
distribution of their leaflets by the Government and no publication of an 
explanatory leaflet handicapped the ‘Yes’ side. Although the fact that the 
relatively high support for devolution before the campaign started to decline 
during the campaign suggests that the ‘No’ side had simply better arguments. 
Besides, the ‘No’ campaign was better organized and was well financed from 
Scottish business circles that saw devolution as source of more bureaucracy 
and tax raising (Bochel et al. 1981, 141).
It also has to be emphasized that the referendum happened to be held 
at a time when support for the two parties most closely identified with 
the devolution policy–Labour and the SNP–were at a low ebb, but the 
Conservatives were unusually high in Scotland. For several reasons quite 
unconnected with devolution, mainly industrial unrest, Labour was put 20 
percentage points behind of the Conservatives according to the polls. In the 
same period the SNP had declined steadily, and polls suggested that they 
would receive only about 20 percent of the Scottish vote. In contrast, the 
Tories, who were clearly identified with the ‘No’ side, were increasingly 
popular (Bochel et al. 1981, 141). This is highly important because the support 
for devolution seems to have been related to electors’ party sympathy. Each 
and every opinion poll during the campaign reported a large majority of SNP 
voters willing to vote ‘Yes’, a majority for ‘No’ amongst the Conservatives, 
and a declining majority of Labour voters intending to vote ‘Yes’ (Bochel et 
al. 1981, 141). When governments take a certain position on a referendum 
issue voters usually use their referendum vote to indicate their approval or 
rejection of the government’s policy (Fisher et al. 2003, 89-90).
The defeat of devolution was the immediate cause of the collapse of the 
Labour government, which was followed by eighteen years of Conservative 
rule. The new Conservative government, elected in May 1979, repealed 
the Scotland and Wales Act in June 1979. Although the Conservative Party 
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campaigned for a ‘No’ vote, they promised that they would introduce an 
improved measure with stronger powers. Nothing realized from this, the 
Tories used the small ‘Yes’ majority as a justification for taking no further 
action (Harvie 1994, 192-197).
The defeat of Labour’s devolutionary Scotland Bill did not destroy the 
devolution movement. Indeed, in the years after 1979 it seemed to develop 
even greater political influence. One of the reasons for this was the electoral 
dominance of the Conservative Party throughout the 1980s and the 1990s 
in Britain and the impact of the Thatcherism on Scotland. Scotland has 
repeatedly voted for left–of–centre parties but has had to accept a series of 
Tory governments. The Conservative governments of these years introduced 
radical withdrawal from the public intervention in support of industry and 
carried through a number of measures, above all the Community Charge, 
which stimulated open hostility in Scotland (Devine 1999, 606).
On the first anniversary of the 1979 devolution referendum, 1 March 
1980, an all-party Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) was established to 
renew the fight for devolution. Its aim was to bring together Labour, Liberal 
Democrats, the SNP and representatives of the civil society, but during the 
1980s it ceased to reach its goal. The Conservative victory in 1987 eventually 
enforced a real cooperation of the Scottish MPs and civil organizations. The 
Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) was set up in 1989 and included 
58 of Scotland’s 72 MPs, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Nationalists, besides 
the representatives of the Churches, Unions and other civic groups. The 
Convention produced two reports, the first in 1990, Towards Scotland’s 
Parliament. The second report developed a detailed plan for a Scottish 
Parliament and was published in 1995, with the title Scotland’s Parliament, 
Scotland’s Right (Bogdanor 1999, 197). This report contained proposals for 
the implementation of a devolution scheme, rather than arguments for and 
against devolution (“Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right” 2006).
Nevertheless, referring to Scottish historical distinctiveness and the right of 
peoples to self–determination it set out the case for the reestablishment of the 
Scottish Parliament (“Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right” 2006). One of 
the most effective arguments of the proposal was economic subsidiarity, but 
at the same time it opposed secession from the United Kingdom in political 
terms (“Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right” 2006).
The Labour Party manifesto for May 1997 general election contained the 
devolution policy presented in the SCC reports (“Labour Party Manifesto 
1997…” 2007) and after winning the elections the new Labour government 
of Tony Blair published its detailed plan for Scottish devolution in the White 
Paper Scotland’s Parliament, in July 1997. This proposed the establishment 
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of a Scottish Parliament with domestic law–making and taxation powers 
(“White Paper–Scotland’s Parliament” 2006).
 Labour’s tactic was to disarm English parliamentary criticism of devolution 
by a referendum on the issue. Unlike 1979, this referendum was held before 
the relevant devolution bill was introduced into Parliament, not after it had 
been enacted. This was to ensure that devolution was the expressed will of 
the people of Scotland and not simply a government policy. The referendum 
held on 11 September 1997 had a positive outcome for the two propositions: 
74.3% supported the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and 63,5% 
agreed that the new Scottish Parliament should have tax–varying powers as 
well (Bogdanor 1999, 199).
This was followed by the establishment of a new constitutional settlement 
in Britain. After this result, the Scotland Bill was introduced in Parliament 
in January 1998 and became law as the Scotland Act in November that year. 
The new Scottish Parliament was modelled after the Westminster Parliament 
and consists of 129 members, 73 directly elected on constituency basis, and 56 
additional members. It has the power to make law for Scotland in devolved 
areas: health, education, re–education, local authorities, traffic, social 
work, economic development, legal system, protection of the environment, 
agriculture, sport and arts. The issues that are concerned with the UK 
remained at Westminster, e.g. foreign policy, defence and national security, 
fiscal economy and monetary policy (“Scotland Act 1998” 2008).
3. Democratic Deficit, Europeanization, New Nationalism?
When comparing the results of the referendums of 1979 and of 1997 several 
questions emerge. Why was the referendum in 1979 unsuccessful and why 
was the one in 1997 successful? Which political factors were fateful? Why was 
the electorate’s attitude different in 1997 to 1979? To answer these questions 
several points have to be taken into consideration.
In the first place, the political background must be investigated. In the 
1970s devolution was primarily an attempt to settle the Nationalists without 
seriously changing the status quo. The introduction of the devolution bill and 
the referendum of 1979 took place in an unstable political climate. After the 
elections in February 1974 Harold Wilson could only establish a minority 
Labour government. Wilson needed the support of the nine nationalist MP’s 
as well as the fourteen Liberals, who were strongly supporting devolution, 
while the Labour manifesto did not contain any reference to devolution. 
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The government was therefore vulnerable to pressures from the Liberals, 
Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru. Yet Labour won an overall majority 
of three MPs in October 1974, James Callaghan’s government by 1977 had 
again no majority after a series of by-election defeats. The Scotland and Wales 
Bill gained a second reading only after the referendums in both places were 
conceded. On the Labour side, ten MPs voted against the bill, while forty-
five abstained. It was highly noticeable that the governing party did not give 
complete support to its government’s bill (Bogdanor 1999, 177-180).
It is not surprising that by 1979 the Scottish public was disillusioned with 
the struggle which preceded the referendum on devolution. Although Labour 
officially supported devolution, they were divided on the issue. While in 
London the Labour government backed devolution, prominent Scottish 
Labour MPs such as Robin Cook and Tam Dalyell launched the “Labour 
Vote No” campaign. The Tories despite the Declaration of Perth opposed 
any form of devolution. The SNP was agonizing over devolution; it provided 
something touchable, reachable on the short run, although the ultimate goal 
was independence (Brown et al. 1998, 21).
Due to the general division of the ‘Yes’ side there were no clear cut 
messages that could reach the electorate. This caused a huge gap between 
support for different kinds of self–government in general and the ‘Yes’ votes 
in the referendum of 1979, whereas this gap became minimal in 1997. The 
table below shows the referendum vote of the supporters of independence, 
devolution and self–government in 1979 and in 1997:
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Apart from this the SNP’s campaign for an independent Scotland 
caused tension between attitudes to devolution and independence. While 
devolutionists insisted on distinguishing themselves from those who wanted 
independence, they often used the principle that supported the case of 
independence: the right to self–determination. Devolutionists preferred the 
status quo to independence in 1979 and vice versa in 1997 (Dardanelli 2005a, 
338).
Secondly, aside from the political division Scotland was in a problematic 
economic period and this proved to be a potent argument against devolution. 
In the 1970s the discovery of North Sea oil gave greater support to the 
economy of the USA than to that of Scotland (Finlay 2004, 333). At a time 
when the UK was to face one crisis after another the Scottish electorate was 
more concerned with jobs and living standards than with devolution. Scots 
worried about distancing themselves from the UK and the economic stability 
of the common British market, in such an era when the European Community 
was not stable enough to provide the economic security that Scotland needed 
(Dardanelli 2005b, 172).
The political and economic climate in 1997 was very different from 1979. 
On the one hand the Tory governments had severely alienated the Scots in 
political and in economic terms as well. On the other hand the parties of the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention managed to reach an agreement on key 
issues. This created a united pro–devolution standpoint in the Labour and the 
Liberal Democrat Parties, and later on in the SNP. In particular Scottish Labour 
shifted from support for a weak assembly in the 1970s to the viewpoint that 
only a devolved Scottish parliament with the right of legislation could have 
protected Scotland from Thatcherism in the 1980s. The other major difference 
was that devolution was seen as one of the most important platforms of the 
new Labour government itself in 1997. One of the reasons for this sensitivity 
of New Labour to the devolution issue was the Scottish dominance that 
emerged within the party by the end of twentieth century (Stenhouse 2004, 
41). The change within the Labour Party is matched by changes in the wider 
political context (Taylor and Thomson 1999, 174-180).
It is also important to emphasize that all previous Home Rule and 
devolution bills, except for the Ireland Act of 1920, were introduced in 
parliaments where the government was dependent upon nationalist votes. 
The Labour government of 1997, in contrast, was absolutely independent of 
nationalist votes. On the contrary, it had a majority of 177 seats, the largest 
majority that Westminster has had since 1935 (Bogdanor 1999, 201). The 
referendum of 1997 took place while the new government and Tony Blair as 
PM were quite popular especially in Scotland. This influenced the final result 
of the referendum of 1997 in a positive way: support for the devolution issue 
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in Scotland can be seen as an approval of the Blair government’s policy as 
well (Fisher et al. 2003, 88-89).
As for the Scottish economy, it touched the bottom in the early 1980s 
and from the mid 1980s saw a complete metamorphosis: from an industrial 
economy, it gradually became a modern, high-tech economy with a prosperous 
future. Together with Ireland, Scotland proved to be one of the most attractive 
locations in Europe for inward investment. Still, the main powerhouses of 
growth in Scotland were the financial services. Edinburgh emerged as one of 
the most important financial centres in Western Europe. Scots started to believe 
in Scotland again: they are just as viable as Ireland (Finlay 2004, 380-385).
Accompanying the accumulating economic and social tension and the 
doubtless negative effects of the democratic deficit in Scotland, the growing 
importance of the EU also contributed to the success of the referendum of 
1997. On the one hand, the progression of the EU influenced the economic 
efficiency of the UK. In addition, the EU started to substitute the UK as the 
larger entity that could provide economic and financial security for Scotland. 
On the other hand, the European context changed the Scottish electorate’s 
attitude towards independence (as a possible consequence of devolution): it 
was preferred to the status quo in 1997 because it would have taken place in the 
EU. The dramatic rise in the support for independence was mainly due to the 
SNP’s embrace of the EU and the positive example of Ireland’s membership 
(Paterson 1998, 196-205) and the positive example of Ireland’s membership of 
the EU. The latest suggested that Scotland could hope not only for economic 
benefits, but also for the increase of its influence as an independent member 
of the EU (Salmond 1998, 72). For nationalists in Scotland the EU implies the 
end of the UK as a single country. In their view the EU is moving towards a 
“Europe of Regions.” In this interpretation the smaller countries of the UK no 
longer need to belong to a single state for security or for economic stability 
(Fisher et al 2003, 129).
The EU is not only attractive for the Nationalists, but also for the supporters 
of limited self-government. For Labour and the Liberals, the key point was 
subsidiarity: the EU principle that decisions should be taken at the lowest level. 
Devolution from this aspect tends to strengthen democracy since it brings 
decision making closer to the citizens (Guibernau 2007, 54). Besides, the 
constitutional issues the EU’s social policy supports a welfare–state consensus 
that Scotland seems to favour. As far as the position of women, the rights of 
workers and public spending on social infrastructure were concerned, the EU 
Commission was in conflict with the UK Conservative Government and hence 
seemed an ally to many politicians in Scotland (Brown et al. 1998, 22-23).
The all-pervasive nature of the EU can be detected in different segments of 
life: politics, economy, and also in the fields of identity creation. The growing 
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importance of supra-state membership has had deep impacts in the interplay 
of the Scottish-British dual identity (Moreno 2006, 7). It is noteworthy that the 
number of those who identified themselves as Scottish has risen significantly 
since the late seventies. Whereas over one-third of the respondents opted for 
‘British’, and over half ’Scottish’ in 1979, by 1992 only a quarter considered 
themselves ’British,’ and almost three-quarters ‘Scottish’ (Paterson et al. 
2001, 105-106). This suggests that in the years of Conservative rule, with 
the appearance of the Europeanization the sense of Scottish identity was 
intensified and did not fall back to previous levels.
In Scotland European identity–and a more positive attitude to the process 
of Europeanization–has been underlined in contrast to that south of the border 
(Moreno 2006, 9). Besides, Scottish preferences for Europe were illustrated by 
a cultural shift that appeared at the first time since the Union with England. No 
longer was England admired as the source of new ideas, Brussels became the 
new cultural point of comparison for Scots. This slow reorientation of Scotland 
towards the EU and away from Britain can still be seen nowadays (Brown et al. 
1998, 124-126). Above this shift a new vitality occurred in Scottish culture from 
the 1980s which contributed to preference for devolution. The Gaelic culture 
and Scottishness in general were celebrated and younger generations of Scots 
started to feel confident about their own national identity (Devine 1999, 608).
The effort to stimulate a sense of Scottishness was only the first step; 
the second step was more difficult: to convince Scots that this identity had 
a positive and political meaning. Scottish identity gradually gained more 
political content and contributed to the beneficial atmosphere in Scotland 
when the second referendum took place in the 1990s (Mitchel 1996, 25).
To summarize, it can be argued that the growing influence of 
Europeanization contributed to the revival of the ethno-territorial feature of 
Scottish compound nationality, thus leading to higher demand for political 
autonomy and finally to the success in the referendum of 1997. It is important 
to emphasize that the external dimensions had a crucial impact, while 
intensifying the effects of the democratic and social deficit of Thatcherism, 
the economic, political difficulties and the rise of Scottish nationalism, on the 
change of support for devolution between 1979 and 1997.
Conclusion
It has been argued that the Scottish campaign for self–government or 
independence is one of the world’s oldest national movements. As such it 
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has changed a lot through the centuries and now it is flourishing as never 
before and reached its major triumph in 1997. This resulted in the emphatic 
endorsement of a Scottish parliament in the 1997 referendum. Nevertheless, 
the route to the success of the referendum in 1997 was far from being one–way 
or unambiguous. Being ‘British’ and ‘Scottish’ at the same time determines the 
Scottish national movement even today. In the context of the British Empire the 
Treaty of Union had envisaged Scottish identity being preserved through her 
legal system and system of church government. In the modern world Scottish 
identity is determined far more by the institutions of government than by 
the legal system or the church. In the twentieth century a need emerged for 
measures on government level that provide for real Scottish distinctiveness. 
This need culminated in the referendums of 1979 and 1997. 
The results of the referendums have shed light upon the fluid nature of 
Scottish identity. During the two decades after the unsuccessful referendum 
of 1979 the strengthening of the Scottish national identity, the influence of 
the European Union, domestic politics of the United Kingdom’s governments 
together led to the establishment of a political climate beneficial for the new 
referendum. The breakthrough of 1997 and the reestablishment of the Scottish 
Parliament are interpreted differently in traditional political circles and in the 
SNP. From the first point of view, Scottish devolution can be seen as means 
of renegotiating the terms of the Union, so as to make them more responsive 
to Scottish opinion, while from the SNP’s point of view it is seen as the first 
step towards independence (Bogdanor 1999, 118-119). According to the SNP, 
an independent Scotland would not be isolated in a European context but it 
would be an active member of the EU, abandoning some of its sovereignty 
not to the UK, but to that wider Union (Brown 1998, 215). This program fits 
into the European idea of regionalism and subsidiarity where sovereignty is 
redefined in such a way that a monolithic democracy breaks down to permit a 
redistribution of power as new political structures are formed at the regional 
level (Brown et al., 231).
However, the creation of the Scottish parliament established an 
asymmetrical political structure in the UK by recognizing Scotland as distinct 
from other areas of Britain. This asymmetrical structure born with devolution 
has become a highly contentious issue which automatically provokes 
passionate reactions (for example the West Lothian Question) (Brown 1998, 
217-218). But only this kind of political autonomy, which is regarded as an 
intermediate option between simply acknowledging the cultural specificity 
of a region and the sharing of sovereignty in a federation, could offer an 
acceptable alternative for some “nations without states,” if they are to be 
discouraged from seeking independence.
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The latest opinion polls show that devolution does not fully satisfy self–
governance claims, but it does tend to weaken them. Devolution in itself 
cannot save the Union, but it seems clear that the United Kingdom’s future 
will depend on how the Parliaments in Edinburgh and in London perform. 
The other influential factor will be the EU’s attitude to the ambitions of the 
“nations without states.” Thus in the twenty–first century, Scotland could 
easily opt for independence versus Union in the “Europe of Regions”.
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